




The Report committee for Tristan Shawn Johnson









Tristan Shawn Johnson, B.A.
Report
Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School
of the University of Texas at Austin
in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements
for the Degree of
Master of Arts




You’re my Pube Shirt
Acknowledgement
I would like to express my deepest appreciation to my committee supervisor, Dr. Josh Dever,
who provided endless support and uncountably many helpful ideas without which this paper would
not have been possible.
I would also like to thank Dr. Ray Buchanan and Dr. Paul Teller for there helpful comments
and guidance as well.





Tristan Shawn Johnson, MA
University of Texas at Austin 2010
Supervisor: Josh Dever
In this paper I argue that the presentist cannot deal adequately with cross-temporal relations. I
look at several attempts to solve the cross-temporal relations objection and find only one that might
work. Still I argue that even it can’t deal with cross-temporal spatial relations such as continuity.
I defend Sider here against two plausible responses. The first is that instantaneous velocities can
be employed on the presentist’s behalf to get them out of trouble. I argue that this response won’t
work. The second is a response by Dean Zimmerman in which the presentist accepts that past
space-time points exist at present. I argue that his response does indeed provide us with a solution
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1 Introduction
There’s a well known divide in the philosophy of time between presentists and eternalists. Presentism
is the view that the only things that exist simpliciter are those existing presently. This is not the
trivial thesis that the only things that exist now are those existing presently, or the false claim
that the only things that exist timelessly are those that exist now. Rather, it’s the view that the
only things that exist, with quantifiers wide open, are the things presently existing. Eternalists, by
contrast, think that when we open our quantifiers all the way we get all past, present, and future
objects. Each view has its merits and demerits but overall I feel eternalism is superior. One reason
for this assessment is presentism’s inability to adequately deal with the problem of cross-temporal
relations—at least that’s what I’ll argue in this paper.
Roughly stated the problem is that if past objects don’t exist, then present objects can’t stand in
relations to them, but there are numerous relations holding between past and present objects. This
problem is not unfamiliar to the presentist and many have proposed solutions to it. In this paper
I’ll consider several of those proposals and show why they either don’t work or are unacceptable.
I’ll then identify a view of presentism put forth by Sider [11] that may have a shot at dealing
with cross-temporal relations adequately. The rest of the paper argues that it too fails. I defend
a later argument by Sider [12] to the effect that presentism, in any form, can’t distinguish various
cross-temporal spatial relations—like accelerated, inertial, continuous or discontinuous motion. In
defending Sider’s argument I consider two main responses. The first, involves the central claim
that instantaneous velocity is an intrinsic property. I argue that it is not, and that even if it were,
Sider’s argument still goes through. The second is Dean Zimmerman’s surrogate and empty-box
view. I argue that the surrogate view doesn’t represent a solution to the problem but that though
the empty-box view does it comes at much too high a price. I conclude that cross-temporal relations
represents a serious threat to the presentist’s position and that we should prefer eternalism.
1
2 The Problem of Cross-Temporal Relations
What are cross-temporal relations? Roughly they are relations that have relata that exist at different
times. Many relations that can hold between relata existing simultaneously can also hold between
relata existing at distinct times. I can admire my wife, for instance, a person I’m contemporaneous
with, but I can also admire Aristotle, a person I’m not. Taller than, smarter than, uglier than
and other general comparative, despising, loving, admiring and other intensional relations, father
of, descendent of, philosophic parent of, and other ancestor relations all appear, sometimes, cross-
temporal. Some miscellaneous but no less important examples include, change, set membership,
reference, causation, and the purely temporal before and after. Cross-temporal relations are trouble
for the presentist. Here’s an abstract version of the argument from cross-temporal relations against
presentism:
(1) Presentism: The only things that exist simpliciter are those existing presently.
(2) Principle of Relations (PR): For any relation R, if R is an n-placed relation holding between
〈x1, x2, x3, ..., xn〉 then all of x1, x2, x3, ..., xn must exist.
(3) Cross-Temporality (CT): Certain sentences concerning no longer presently existing entities
that have a relation to presently existing entities (CT-sentences) are correctly evaluated as
true.1
(4) So let R be an n-placed cross-time relation holding between 〈x1, x2, x3, ..., xn〉.
(5) Since R is a cross-temporal relation at least two of the relata, say xi and xj , are not contem-
poraneous.
(6) Let xi exist i.e. be present.
(7) Then xj doesn’t exist (by 5, and presentism).
1From Torrengo [16]).
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(8) But xj does exist (by PR).
(9) So presentism is false.
In the next four sections we’ll look at various proposals for dealing with this argument. The
first three proposals I’ll dispatch rather quickly (within the sections they’re elaborated in) but the




A quick way out of the problem of relations is to deny that the holding of a relation entails the
existence of that relation’s relata i.e. to deny PR. Meinong and others have found motivation for
such a denial in the relation of intensionality since it can sometimes seem directed toward non-
existent objects like God or Santa. Since we can stand to Santa in the love relation, and since Santa
doesn’t exist, it must be that loving Santa doesn’t entail his existence. But if intensional relations
can hold between existent and non-existent relata, why can’t cross-temporal relations hold between
existent and non-existent relata? The view that they can is called frivolous presentism. Thomas M.
Crisp [6] defines frivolous presentism as follows,
Frivolous Presentism: It is always the case that: (i) for every x, x is present, but (ii) it is, was
or will be the case that, for at least one x, x has a property or stands in a relation at a time t
such that x does not exist at t.
Denying PR allows the frivolous presentists to easily avoid the problem of cross-temporal rela-
tions. For instance ‘Caroline is the daughter of JFK’ is about a genuine cross-temporal relation
holding between Caroline and JFK, but only Caroline exists, so presentism is preserved at the
expense of PR. Is this a price we should be willing to pay? Thomas Crisp thinks not, he writes,
The main problem with this reply to the objection from cross-time relations is that it is
so difficult to believe. The suggestion here is that Caroline bears a relation R to JFK and
Jackie, but there is nothing to which she bears R. Bizarre. To be sure, some presentists
of the more Meinongian bent will see no problem here. But for those suspicious of
propertied non-existents, the frivolous presentist’s reply simply is not a serious option.
I agree with Crisp. To my mind frivolous presentism (alone, i.e. not in conjunction with Meinon-
gianism) is a dead hypothesis, to employ a notion of William James’ [8]. It’s just too implausible to
take seriously.
4
But what about those Meinongians for which frivolous presentism would seem natural? What
should we say about the Meinongian presentist? Fortunately there seems to be a very good reason
we won’t have to delve into the murky waters of Meinongianism. Here’s why. Suppose a presentist is
also a Meinongian. Such a combination, with respect to time, is indistinguishable from eternalism.
Both employ different names for the same ontological categories. Past and future objects would not
exist but would have being and could stand in cross-temporal relations. Such objects are simply
those that exist-at a time for the eternalist. The objects that exist for the presentist Meinongian are
those that exist-at present (where ‘present’ is an indexical) for the eternalist.2 They may conceive
of the categories differently but given the roles they each want the objects in those categories to
play it’s difficult to see any difference between the two views.
Of course there will be other stuff in the Meinongian presentists ontology. For instance they may
accept that Santa Clause has being though he doesn’t exist. Where is he on the eternalist picture?
This is irrelevant. As far as time goes the Meinongian presentist and the eternalist are indistinguish-
able. What they say about fictitious characters (the eternalist is free to be a Meinongian) is none of
my concern. So frivolous presentism, alone, doesn’t really represent a serious option and frivolous
presentism in conjunction with Meinongianism turns out to be indistinguishable from eternalism
and therefore won’t help the presentist avoid the problem of cross-temporal relations. We now turn
to Crisp’s response.
2I assume the eternalist is a detenser but nothing turns on this assumption.
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4 Crisp’s Response
In this section I’ll explicate Crisp’s [6] response and then say why I think it fails. Crisp’s main line
of thought is simple though the details get slightly complicated. Consider,
(1) Clinton admires JFK.
(2) Bush is of the same political party as Lincoln.
(3) Today’s flood was caused by yesterday’s downpour.
(4) Caroline is the daughter of JFK and Jackie.
and,
(1′) Clinton bears the admires relation to JFK.
(2′) Bush bears the same political party relation to Lincoln.
(3′) Today’s flood bears the is caused by relation to yesterday’s downpour.
(4′) Caroline bears the daughter of relation to JFK and Jackie.
Crisp claims that the argument from cross-temporal relations requires the following two thesis:
(MF): Sentences of ordinary language like (1)-(4) express Moorean facts.3
(NP): Sentences of ordinary language like (1)-(4) are predicative with respect to names of non-present
entities.
His main argument runs as follows: either (1′) - (4′) are what’s actually meant by (1)-(4) or
they’re not. If so then (1)-(4) are not Moorean facts. If not, then they are not predicative with
respect to the names of non-present entities. In either case the conjunction of MF and NP is false.
3Moorean facts are the type of things we know better than any premise in a philosophical argument to the contrary.
‘This is a hand’ uttered while holding up a hand is the classic example.
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But since the argument from cross-temporal relations requires the truth of this conjunction it must
be unsound. That’s the main line of argument. Let’s see how he supports his premises.
Assume (1′) - (4′) are strict philosophic ways of saying (1)-(4), then the latter are not Moorean
facts since the former aren’t. Why aren’t the former Moorean facts? To be a Moorean fact they
would have to fall into one of three categories: deliverance of our sense, truths of reason, or such
that they have Moorean evidence for them. They clearly don’t fall into the first two categories and
Crisp argues that they don’t fall into the last category either as follows. He starts by giving the
below account of Moorean evidence:
ME: q is Moorean evidence for a proposition p iff (i) q is in either the set of propositions that are
deliverances of reason or the senses for which there is no knock down argument and which one
would be crazy not to believe, or the set of propositions for which there are good arguments
such that one would be crazy not to accept them once grasping those arguments, and (ii) the
conditional epistemic probability of p on q is high. Where the conditional epistemic probability
of p on q—P (p/q)—is the degree to which a human being of sound understanding could believe
p if she fully believed q, had no other evidence for or against p, and considered the evidential
bearing of q on p.
The question then is, can we find a proposition that would count as Moorean evidence for, say,
(4′)? Crisp argues no. If (4′) is just the philosophically sophisticated way of saying (4) then any
Moorean evidence for the one would be evidence for the other. So let E be the conjunction of
all the Moorean evidence for (4). This will include legal documents, testimonials, medical records,
newspaper reports, and generally the type of stuff a historian would produce as evidence for such a
claim. But E won’t be Moorean evidence for (4′). This is because (4′) entails (5)
(5) Quantifying unrestrictedly, something is identical with JFK.
so by the probability calculus P (4′/E) ≤ P (5/E). But E doesn’t make (5) probable at all. E
is just the wrong type of evidence required to support (5). Legal documents and old newspapers
7
won’t settle a debate concerning ontology. Since Crisp can’t think of any other Moorean facts that
could be conjoined with E to establish (5) he concludes that it’s not a Moorean fact and therefore
neither is (4′). But if (4′) isn’t a Moorean fact then neither is (4) under the assumption that the
former is just a philosophically sophisticated way of saying the latter. That’s the first disjunct. On
to the second.
Suppose (1′) - (4′) are not strict philosophic ways of saying (1) - (4), then the latter are not
predicative with respect to names. Assume they are. Then, sticking with our example, (4) commits
one to (5). If (4) is predicative of ‘JFK’ then there must be something that is identical with JFK.
But now the reasoning above that showed that (4′) wasn’t a Moorean fact since it commits one to
(5) can also be used to show that (4) is no Moorean fact. Thus Crisp concludes that either (1) - (4)
are not Moorean facts or they are not predicative with respect to the names of non-present entities.
And since he thinks the cross-temporal relations objection requires both MF and NP that argument
must be unsound.
But Crisp’s response fails. First it’s not at all obvious why the argument from cross-temporal re-
lations requires the conjunction of MF and NP. But even if it does Crisp’s argument isn’t convincing.
The fact that (4′) is not Moorean doesn’t show that (4) is not Moorean, even supposing the former
is the proper analysis of the latter. I say this for two reasons: First, if this line of thought were right
it would prove too much, just take any putative Moorean fact and it’s philosophic analysis. I wager
that the analysis won’t be a Moorean fact. But then it would follow that the putative Moorean fact
isn’t a Moorean fact either. And it would be special pleading to think that this line of reasoning
works here but not in others cases. Second, and related, it just seems to me that the analysand, if
informative, is likely to have a different epistemic status than the analysandum. So the fact that x
is a Moorean fact and y is its analysand, doesn’t entail that y is Moorean.
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5 Overlap Approach
In this section we’ll consider the overlap view.4 We’ll see that it’s not very plausible in its skeletal
form and offer a few modifications. I’ll then point to some problems I see with the modifications
considered and leave it at that. The overlap view is tempting and maybe there are modifications
that will work but that’s not a task I’ve seen completed and it’s not a task I see easily completed.
The overlap approach denies neither PR nor CT but attempts to show how presently existing
things can stand in relation to non-present and therefore non-existing things. On this view all that
is needed for x to stand in relation R to y where x is present and y is not, is for there to exist an
object5 O such that y once stood to O in some relation R′ and x now stands to O in some relation
R′′. For anyone that believes in necessarily existing object there always will be such an object. The
abstract property being blue for instance might work. Crisp [6] gives the following general recipe:
(i) take a sentence S such that, for some proper names α and β and some two-term
predicate R: S’s grammatical form is “R(α, β),” α denotes some present object α∗, β
does not denote anything but was or will be such that it denotes some object β∗...(ii)
find some object x such that, to put it loosely x’s existence “overlaps” α∗ and β∗ (in
the sense that x coexists with β∗); then (iii) translate S as a claim to the effect that α∗
bears some relation R′ to x and it was or will be the case that x bears some relation R′′
to β∗.
So for example, (4) comes out true because the overlap object being blue, as the case may be,
bears some relation R′ to Bush and once bore some relation R′′ to Lincoln.
Let’s now see why this initial proposal is a nonstarter. Matthew Davidson [7] writes,
I can’t see how this works as a direct answer to the problem of relations. First of all, if
this picture is to work there must be some specificity of the relations involved. Surely it’s
4The overlap view is sometimes attributed to Chisholm [5] but, for my part, I find it difficult to find in that paper.
5I’ll use ‘object’ to follow the literature. Russell’s use of ‘term’ might be more appropriate. It could be anything
from an event, a property, a number, a concrete physical object, basically anything that exists.
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not sufficient for me to stand in the being of the same political party relation to FDR that
I stand in any relation or other with an object that did stand in any relation or other to
FDR. Can it really be that the fact that some relation or other holds between me and
an object and some relation or other held between that object and another suffices for
the fact that a particular relation – being of the same political party – holds between me
and the other object?
Davidson’s objection is exactly right; the account over generates if the nature of the relations
involved, and the overlap object, are not restricted. Hitler for instance once bore the coexisting
relation with the abstract object being blue as Obama presently does, yet Hitler and Obama aren’t
of the same political party. But how do we modify the view?
5.1 Modified Overlap Approach
Both Davidson and Crisp modify the overlap account in plausible ways6 but I’m still skeptical that
the view is viable. Let’s start with Crisp. He thinks the overlap theorist takes (2) and (4) to express,
(2′′) Bush belongs to a political party P such that WAS(Lincoln belongs to P ).
and,
(4′) Caroline is such that WAS(She is born to JFK and Jackie).
respectively. He claims, plausibly, that the overlap objects in question are the political party P and
Caroline herself. There’s no appeal here to any necessarily existing objects tenuously connected to
the relevant subjects. Both the political party P and Caroline (whether abstract or not) seem highly
relevant to the relation in question. But how do we determine what object is the actual overlap
object when there are many plausible candidates? Consider the following claim,
(6) I admire Aristotle.
6Crisp doesn’t explicitly modify the account but the examples he chooses illustrate certain restrictions.
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The admires relation, the abstract information that is Aristotle’s writings, and the numerous
objects that link Aristotle to me (physical books and such) are all plausible overlap objects. But
which is the correct one? An account is desperately needed.
Davidson offers on the overlapper’s behalf that we “require that the relation that is supposed to
hold between the present entity and the past entity be such that it also is the relation that holds
between the two present entities.” This suggestions while getting a lot right still misses much.7
Caroline, for example, is the most plausible object of overlap in (4) yet she isn’t the daughter of
herself.
The considerations above hopefully suggest that the overlap response is not very promising. At
minimum they should show there are details to be worked out for those who find the view viable.
This is the last of the three responses I consider implausible. We’re now going to turn to a response
I think is more plausible.
7See Davidson [7] for his own rejection of his own suggestion.
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6 Super and Quasi-supervenience Basis
In this section I’ll do some preliminary discussion of a plausible and popular response before moving
on to Sider’s specific version of it.
Many presentists wrestle with the grounding problem. Roughly how can the presentist ground
(or find truthmakers for) sentences about the past like, ‘Lincoln was tall’? Let’s suppose they can
do it. These grounding facts would provide a supervenience basis that could potentially ground
CT -sentences as well. Bourne [3] develops an ersatzer presentism that takes sets of propositions as
times. The propositions contained in a time are, intuitively, the ones true of that time. This gives
him a supervenience basis for which he thinks he can ground the truth of CT -sentences. Bigelow
employs facts true at the present. Two physically indistinguishable present times could differ with
respect to the facts true of those times. In one Hannibal won at Cannae in the other he didn’t, for
instance. These facts work, in effect, as his supervenience basis.
Let’s look at a simple case they handle reasonably well.
(7) Lincoln was taller than Gary Coleman is.
This CT -sentence is true because the height of Lincoln is greater than the height of Gary Cole-
man. So all they need is the height of Lincoln and Coleman. But both are in their supervenience
basis. For Bourne they’re given by propositions in the relevant times, for Bigelow by facts true at
present.
I don’t care how they get their respective supervenience basis. My concern is the richness of
such a basis. I’ll argue, following Sider [12], that it won’t be rich enough to deal with cross-temporal
spatial relations.
6.1 Sider 1999)
Sider [11] adopts a version of the softening approach. He doesn’t paraphrase CT -sentences but
rather claims they are, strictly speaking, false. Since doing this conflicts with our ordinary common
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sense and since we often have good evidence for CT -sentences he tries to mitigate this offense. He
offers underlying truths in the neighborhood of the CT -sentences to accomplish this goal. He claims
that the CT -sentences are quasi-true and that this sufficiently discharges the presentist’s obligation
to explain our intuitions.8 Sider gives the following technical definition to quasi-truth:
(QT) S is quasi-true iff there is a true proposition p such that, were X true, p would have been
true and would have entailed the truth of S.
Where X ranges over theses of ontology like presentism, eternalism, or platonism etc. In the
present debate eternalism is substituted for X. The set of underlying truths is a quasi-supervenience
base for the quasi-truths. To illustrate consider Sider’s example,
(8) Abraham Lincoln was tall.
For Sider’s presentist (8) is strictly speaking false but quasi-true. The presentist has at his
disposal a whole array of true tensed propositions concerning Abraham Lincoln. For example,
WAS(Lincoln is tall), WAS(Lincoln is honest), WAS(Lincoln signing the Emancipation Proclama-
tion) etc. More than this they have an array of tensed facts about Lincoln that just mention the
subatomic goings on. These underlying truths are the quasi-supervenience base for the quasi-truths
about Lincoln. Were eternalism true these underlying truths would also be true and would entail
the truth of (8). Thus (8) is quasi-true.
We need to make a quick distinction before we can see what the central problem with this view
is. The distinction is between internal and external relations. Internal relations hold solely in virtue
of intrinsic properties had at times. Michael Jordan being taller than Spud Webb is an internal
relation. External relations require something more. Change is an external relation. The change
of an iron that goes from hot to cold doesn’t depend solely on the intrinsic features of the iron at
times. If it did it would be indistinguishable from a change in an iron that goes from cold to hot.
The intrinsic properties matter, but so does the temporal order.
8For a critique of Sider’s notion of quasi-truth see Crisp [6].
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Can a quasi-supervenience basis be provided for both internal and external relations? Let T be
the totality of all sentences of the form ‘It WAS/Will BE the case n units of time ago/hence that: φ’.
T determines a series of “snapshots” of the universe at successive moments, complete with the order
and temporal relations between each snapshot. It tells us about all the intrinsic properties that any
object of history has at any given time. Since internal relations only require such facts all sentences
about cross-time internal relations will have a quasi-supervenience basis making them quasi-true.
But what about cross-temporal external relations? And in particular, what about cross-temporal
spatial relations? Sider [12] argues not. In the remaining paper I’ll explicate and then defend his
argument.
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7 Sider’s (2004) Argument from Cross-Time Spatial Rela-
tions
Consider an object, O, moving through space during some interval. Here are three possible states
of motion for O:
a) O moves along a continuous unaccelerated path
b) O moves along a continuous accelerated path
c) O moves along a discontinuous path.
The problem for the presentist, Sider argues, is that it’s not clear how they can distinguish
between these three possibilities.
(1) T determines a series of “snapshots” of the universe at successive moments, complete with the
order and temporal relations between each snapshot.
(2) However, T does not determine how these snapshots line up spatially.
(3) But then any one of the three possibilities (a, b or c) is compatible with T .
(4) Thus the theory requires a necessary “bridge principle” that would give us a rule for lining up
the snapshots.
(5) No such bridge principle exists.
(6) So presentism cannot distinguish between a, b or c.
T tells us a great deal about the world at any given time. It tells us all the relative spatial
relations between all objects in the world at a given time. It tells us the temporal ordering of each
snapshot. But what T doesn’t tell us is how these snapshots line up spatially. To put it another
way, a, b, and c represent three distinct cross-temporal external relations that O may enter into,
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but presentism doesn’t tell us which. In terms of quasi -truth: even if eternalism were true, the
quasi -supervenience basis wouldn’t tell us which of many possible block universes is correct.
So the problem for the presentist, if he wants to distinguish between a, b and c, amounts to
finding a necessarily true bridge principle that would tell us how to line up the snapshots spatially.
Sider writes, “The only course open to the presentist would be to provide some sort of necessarily
true ‘bridge principles’ that say: if the series of snapshots takes a certain form, then the snapshots
‘automatically’ line up in such and such a way” [12]. Sider thinks no such bridge principle exists for
the presentist to make use of.
To support this claim Sider rejects three plausible bridge principles, I’ll call the ‘Absolute Space
principle’, the ‘Maximizing Continuity principle’ and the ‘Instantaneous Velocity principle (IVP)’.
We’re primarily interested in IVP but let’s briefly look at the others to help us get a feel for the
problem and what a solution might look like.
7.1 The Absolute Space Principle
Newton believed that space was a substance that objects moved about in. On his view each point of
space endures the passage of time and is always spatially related to every other point of space in the
same way. Due to this the notion of the sameness-of-position had a definite meaning for Newton:
an object is at the same position if it occupies the same (enduring) point of space over time. If this
were true (i) would be easily satisfied because we could tell exactly where an object was at any given
time (and what properties it had at that time).
If space is absolute we have a simple bridge principle: line up all the enduring points of space.
Every snapshot has information about the position of the enduring points of space and by lining
them up we get an automatic (and correct) alignment of the spatial relations of objects across time.
Roughly, the problem with this principle is that there is no good reason to think space is absolute.
In neither Minkowski nor Neo-Newtonian geometry is the notion of sameness-of-position meaningful
(though the notion of inertial motion is).
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7.2 The Maximizing Continuity Principle
If we were to maximize the continuity between every snapshot and the unaccelerated motion of
each snapshot, then we should be able to distinguish between possibilities a, b and c. Since each
snapshot does tell us the spatial relations of each object at that time, we can evaluate how well
a given alignment of the snapshots maximizes continuity and unaccelerated motion by measuring
the distance between objects at one time and comparing them to the distance between those same
objects at different times. Done for all objects this would vastly constrain the possible alignments
and would distinguish the three possibilities.
But this only works if the world we are considering is sufficiently complex. If the world contains
only one object, there would be no way to distinguish the three possible state of motion the object
could be in. Thus the bridge principle, “Maximize continuity and unaccelerated motion,” fails
because it’s not necessary.
7.3 The Instantaneous Velocity Principle
If each snapshot told us not only the position of a given object but also its instantaneous velocity
(often ‘i.v.’), then the presentist could use the bridge principle: align the snapshots so that, at each
instant, the value of the derivative of the position function of each object (at that instant) equals
the objects i.v. (at that instant). This may at first sound question begging since were not sure what
the position function of any object is. However, once an alignment is given there will be a position
function for each object. If we consider just the alignments that give continuous position functions
for each object (this can be done as shown above) then we can just look at those alignments and
find the only one such that the value of the derivative of the position function, at instant t, equals
the value of the instantaneous velocity of each object, at instant t for all times t.
This one might work. Sider rejects this bridge principle because he doesn’t think the instan-
taneous velocity of an object is an intrinsic property of an object at that instant. I think Sider’s
response is correct but rushed and I’m going to give a much fuller defense in the next two sections.
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Intrinsicality is a tough topic and there’s little agreement as to the correct analysis. There is more
consent when it comes to instantaneous velocity though it’s by no means universal. Most people
accept the calculus definition of instantaneous velocity (see appendix 1) though there is wide dis-
agreement about whether or not it’s an intrinsic or extrinsic property. To make matters slightly
worse there are some, notably, Tooley [14] that think the calculus definition fails entirely and he
gives an account on which instantaneous velocity is certainly intrinsic. Since the only way the IVP
will work is if instantaneous velocity is intrinsic I’ll need to consider any account of instantaneous
velocity on which it turns out to be intrinsic. Since this would require too much space I’ll argue in
the following manner. First I’ll assume the calculus definition of instantaneous velocity and then
I’ll lay out the case against it being intrinsic. Second, I’ll give up the assumption of the calculus
definition and assume that instantaneous velocity is an intrinsic property. I’ll then try to show that
on any such account Sider’s argument will still go through.
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8 The Case Against IVP
In this section I’ll argue that the calculus definition of instantaneous velocity is not intrinsic. There
are two parts to this argument. First I’ll argue that on none of the most plausible accounts of
intrinsicality does the calculus instantaneous velocity turn out to be intrinsic. I’ll take this as good
evidence but as the claim is too important I won’t stop there. So second, I’ll arbitrate a debate
between Sheldon Smith and Frank Arntzenius regarding this very question and side with Arntzenius
by concluding that the calculus velocity is not intrinsic.9
8.1 Accounts of Intrinsicality
Defining ‘intrinsic’ would bog us down. Here I’ll show that on three accounts of intrinsicality,
instantaneous velocity comes out extrinsic. Perhaps every account I consider is wrong. But I
assume they agree on the clear cut cases. And the fact that instantaneous velocity isn’t intrinsic on
any of them suggests that it’s not even a boarderline case.
8.1.1 Relational/Non-realtional
One way of making the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction is to take extrinsic properties to by be relational
properties and take intrinsic properties to be non-relational properties. A relational property is a
property that, when instantiated, entails that it’s bearer stand in some relation to another entity.
If instantaneous velocity is a relational property, an object with one must be related to some other
relata. But the instantaneous velocity of an object is always relative to a frame of reference. Standing
on a boat I throw a rock into the sea. At time t0 it reaches a velocity of 100 mph relative to me.
Relative to a person standing on the shore the rock reaches a velocity of 120 mph, since the boat is
moving at 20 mph relative to her. So the calculus velocity is a relational property where the relation
holds between the object “in motion” and some other object fixing the frame of reference. Thus on
this account the calculus velocity turns out relational and hence an extrinsic property.
9Actually my conclusion is a little more subtle but that’s the important part for our purposes.
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8.1.2 Kim’s (1982) account
Here’s Kim’s [9] account:10
D1 (Chisholm) G is rooted outside times at which it is had = df
Necessarily for any object x and any time t, x has the property G at t only if x exists at some
time before or after t.
D2 (Kim) G is rooted outside the objects that have it =df
Necessarily any object x has G only if some contingent object wholly distinct from x exists.
D3 (Kim) G is internal = df
G is neither rooted outside times at which it is had nor outside the objects that have it.
Again the calculus definition turns out not to be an intrinsic (internal) property of objects.
Suppose we are endurantists and suppose O has an instantaneous velocity of 100 mph at time t. In
order for O to satisfy the calculus definition (i.e. to actually have a calculus velocity) O must have
endured throughout some open interval of time. The calculus i.v. is rooted outside t.11 But it is not
rooted outside O. If we are purdurantists and O is a temporal slice that has an i.v. of 100 mph at
time t we get a similar result. The calculus i.v. is both rooted outside t and O, since it implies the
existence of temporal parts other than just O and times other than t. So again the calculus velocity
is not intrinsic on this account.
8.1.3 Duplication
Lewis [10] writes, “The intrinsic properties of something depend only on that thing; whereas the
extrinsic properties of something may depend, wholly or partly, on something else. If something has
an intrinsic property, then so does any perfect duplicate of that thing; whereas duplicates situated
in different surroundings will differ in their extrinsic properties” pp. 197. His tight knit circle of
10See Lewis [10] for a rejection of Kim’s account.
11I think that even if our endurantist is a presentist the calculus i.v. is rooted outside t. The spirit of the definition
would remain if we read ‘x exists at some time before’ as ‘x existed at some time before’.
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interdefinables. An exact duplicate of a is something that shares all the same intrinsic properties of
a. a′ is an exact duplicate of a iff for every intrinsic property Fx such that Fa we also have Fa′.
Consider an object O at just t and suppose it has an instantaneous velocity of v at time t. If
instantaneous velocity is really an intrinsic property of O at just t then any exact physical duplicate
O′ of O will share this intrinsic property. But we can imbed O′ in a history that would require
a different value for the velocity. Imagine O′ lonely in a universe with no history, it’s the only
object in a single object world. Since it’s an exact physical duplicate of O, and since instantaneous
velocity is supposed to be an intrinsic property, O′ has a velocity of v despite the fact that there’s no
open interval around t at which the position development of O′ is defined. But this contradicts the
calculus definition. So again the calculus i.v. turns out to be not intrinsic since duplicates situated
in different surroundings differ with respect to it.
These considerations suggest that the calculus velocity is not an intrinsic property. But let
us not leave the matter unsettled. We’re now going to look at a debate primarily between Frank
Arntzenius and Sheldon Smith that will help assuage any doubt that may remain. If the reader is
already convinced by the above considerations or wishes to avoid a technical discussion he or she
can reasonably skip to the next section and not miss any of the main argument.
8.2 Arbitrating the Debate
David Albert [1] and Frank Arntzenius [2] don’t think velocity is intrinsic. We’ll start with their
arguments and then consider Sheldon Smith’s [13] response and further argumentation.
8.2.1 Albert and Arntzenius’ Arguments
Albert’s Implication Case
Let object O have a constant position function of 5 defined everywhere in some interval around
t and let its position at t be undetermined (see figure 1). By applying only logic and definition to
this information, we can come to know conditional information about O’s instantaneous velocity at
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t. Namely, if O’s position is 5 at t, then its instantaneous velocity at t is zero and if O’s position
is anywhere other than 5 at t, then it’s position function would be discontinuous and it would have
an undefined velocity at t. So given just our knowledge about the position of O at non-t points we
learn that O’s instantaneous velocity at t is either zero or undefined. But if position and velocity
are really part of the instantaneous state of objects at instants, then the position and velocity of O
at t will not be logically and conceptually independent from its positions and velocities during the






Albert concludes that velocity is not truly part of genuine instantaneous states of objects. Rather,
he claims, they are properties of the “immediate vicinity of t” which is a larger temporal span than
just t.
Arntzenius’ Constraint Case
Let O’s position at t be represented by a point p on a piece of paper and its velocity by a
vector emanating from p. If velocity is really an intrinsic property of objects at instants, then this
would impose (by the mere application of logic and definition to information about the velocity at
t) a serious constraint on the possible position developments of O. Any position development of
O around t, represented here as a line, would have to be tangential to the vector at t (as in figure
2-A) which rules out many possible histories. For example O could not have a position function
non-tangent to the vector, nor could it have a gap at t, nor could it peak at t (see figure 2-B, C,
22
and D respectively). But while we may expect the laws of nature to impose such a constraint on
the physically possible histories of O, we do not expect mere application of logic and definition to




























A. B. C. D.Possible Impossible Impossible Impossible
Arntzenius [2] concludes that the calculus velocity isn’t part of instantaneous states. Rather, he
claims, the calculus velocity at t is a property of the position development of the object during any
finite neighborhood of t on which the position development occurs.
What can be said about these two cases? Sheldon Smith thinks both arguments are flawed and
we now move to his response.
8.2.2 Smith’s (2003) Objection
Smith’s [13] argument is directed at Albert and Arntzenius. It has two parts: First, he identifies a
shared intuition that he believes drives both arguments. Second, he argues that this intuition cannot
be motivated. Since this intuition can’t be motivated Smith concludes that we need not accept their
argument.
Independence Intuition
Smith notes that both Albert and Arntzenius feel that instantaneous states must have a certain
independence.
Independence Intuition: The instantaneous state of an object at t should be logically and con-
ceptually independent from its state at instants other than t (before the laws of motion are
given).
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Albert seems to endorse the independence intuition.12 Arntzenius, although not as explicit as
Albert, also seems to accept the independence intuition since it’s a hidden premise getting him from
the fact that the velocity at t constrains the position development within (t−δ, t+δ) to the conclusion
that velocity is not part of the instantaneous state at time t. I also employed this intuition in my
argument that velocity is not intrinsic on Lewis’ account and Tooley worlds presuppose it as well.
So all three aspects of the case against IVP rely on this intuition–hence my concern. Unfortunately,
neither Albert nor Arntzenius offers any support for the independence intuition. Smith claims
not to have the intuition and claims that most of us who have become accustom to viewing both
position and instantaneous velocity as comprising the instantaneous state of objects will not have
this intuition either.
Smith asks why velocities’ lack of independence suggests to Albert and Arntzenius that it’s not
instantaneous. Can the independence intuition be motivated? Smith attempts to motivate it on
their behalf:
If non-t points carry an implication for the velocity at t like the one described above,
[Alberts implication case] then the intuition is that the velocity is as much a property
of the non-t points that carry that implication as it is of t. . . Again, it would seem that
the claim would be that if velocity at t constrains non-t behavior [Arntzenius constraint
case] in some fashion, then the velocity has to be considered, in part, a property of the
12Albert writes:
Let’s start by thinking through what it means to give a complete description of the physical situation
of the world at an instant.
There would seem to be two things you want from a description like that:
a. that it [a complete description of the physical situation of the world at an instant] be genuinely
instantaneous (which is to say that descriptions of the world at different times have the appropriate
sort of logical or conceptual or metaphysical independence of one another, that a perfectly explicit
and intelligible sense can be attached to any temporal sequence whatever of the sorts of descriptions
we have in mind here—whether the sequence happens to be in accord with the dynamical laws or
not, that any such sequence whatever is readable—against the background or within the context or
relative to the framework of the best or last or canonical metaphysical interpretation of whatever
complete theory of the world is under discussion—as a story of the physical world); and
b. that it be complete (which is to say, that all the physical facts about the world can be read off
from the full temporal set of its descriptions).
Good. Lets call whatever satisfies (a) and (b) an instantaneous physical state of the world.
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non-t stuff that is constrained by the t velocity.
Smith’s argues that no matter how one cashes out the expressions “non-t points that carry the
implication” and “constrained non-t points” they will either have no denotation or denote a set of
points that we shouldn’t attribute the velocity to. This leaves the independence intuition lacking
motivation.
Lack of Motivation
What is the denotation of “the non-t stuff” that is so constrained or carries implications? Smith
considers two suggestions roughly given by Albert (A1) and Arntzenius (A2).
A1 The non-t stuff that carries implications for, or is constrained by the velocity at t is the
immediate vicinity of t. The velocity should be considered as much a property of the immediate
vicinity of t as it is of t.
A2 The velocity at t should be considered a property of any set of points that carry implications
for the velocity at t or are constrained by the velocity at t. So while there is no unique non-t
stuff that carries implications for, or is constrained by the velocity at t, any set of the form
(t− δ, t+ δ) with t deleted (hence forth (t− δ, t+ δ)− t) is non-t stuff that is constrained by
(and carries implications for) the velocity at t. The velocity should be considered as much a
property of these sets as it is of t.
Smith quickly dispatches A1. For any point thought to be close or immediate to t we can always
find points closer and still more immediate to t in the standard continuum. So ‘the immediate
vicinity of t’ lacks denotation in the standard continuum. But suggestion A2 is more difficult to
refute and can be seen as two claims:
Constraint Claim: The velocity at t should be considered a property of the position development
on (t − δ, t + δ) − t because the position development of the object is constrained within
(t− δ, t+ δ)− t.
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and
Implication Claim: The velocity at t should be considered a property of the position development
on (t− δ, t+ δ)− t because that collection has implications for the velocity at t.
Smith’s objection to A2, and the above claims, is, roughly, that a set of points having implications
or being constrained (in Arntzenius’ sense) is just not enough to merit attributing the velocity at t
to them. A set of points can’t just be constrained within by the velocity at t it must be constrained
throughout by the velocity at t if those points are to merit attributing the velocity to them. Similarly,
a set of points can’t just have implications for the velocity at t, the velocity must depend on the set
of points if they are to merit attributing the velocity to them. Let’s turn to his argument. I’m going
to first shamelessly quote his argument then attempt to make it precise.
The Argument
Concerning the implication claim Smith writes,
We should reject the claim that the velocity is a property, in part, of all of (t− δ, t+ δ)
with t deleted just because this set has implications for the velocity at t. Most of those
points are not responsible for the implication. But, one might think that it must be the
set of points we left out of (t− δ, t− ε) ∪ (t+ ε, t+ δ), the ones that are in (t− ε, t+ ε)
with t deleted, that the velocity is a property of, for when they are there we do get the
implication. Cannot we claim that the implication arises from that set of points and
include them in the class of points upon which the velocity at t depends, and thus claim
that a velocity value at t is a description in part of what is going on throughout that
interval? No. All of the claims above are true no matter what ε is, as long as it is not
zero. We cannot say what set of non-t points is responsible for that implication for the
velocity at t, because we can always move in toward t in a way that it captures any
point, and (t − δ, t − ε) ∪ (t + ε, t + δ) where ε > 0 is less that δ > 0 never carries the
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implication. While it is true that (t− ε, t+ ε) with t deleted always has the implication,
this fact does not help us to answer what set of points besides t the velocity depends
upon because we can run the same argument again to suggest that most of the points in
that interval are too far away to matter.13
And concerning the constraint claim Smith writes,
Rather than non-t behavior constraining velocity, Arntzenius points out that t velocity
constrains non-t behavior in that once I stipulate the velocity at a point t, the position
behavior within (t − δ, t + δ) with t deleted has to be such that the velocity comes out
to be the stipulated value, but the points in that set are all non-t points. A genuinely
instantaneous property, so he claims, should not imply such a constraint on a non-t
set. . . Thus, one would like to know why the fact that the velocity at t has such impli-
cations for a set of non-t points suggests that it is not instantaneous, for many of us do
not feel that it does suggest that. Again, it would seem that the claim would be that
if velocity at t constrains non-t behavior in some fashion, then the velocity has to be
considered, in part, a property of the non-t stuff that is constrained by the t velocity.
But, what exactly is the non-t stuff that is so constrained? It seems that one will either
claim falsely that it is all of (t−δ, t+δ) or claim that it is something like the “immediate
vicinity of t” which has no denotation.14
Smith accepts both that the velocity at t constrains the position development (t − δ, t + δ) − t
and that the position development on (t− δ, t+ δ)− t has implications for the velocity at t. What
he denies is that these are strong enough conditions to merit property attribution. He argues that
we shouldn’t attribute the velocity at t to all of the points in (t − δ, t + δ) − t; the points on the
outskirts of (t − δ, t + δ) − t are not constrained nor are they “responsible” for the implications it
carries.




Here we’ll clarify Smith’s arguments against A2. They seem initially clear but actually the use
of terms is not. What’s meant by ‘responsibility’, ‘dependence’, or ‘relevance’. Smith argues that
the velocity depends on just the instant t. But is his account of dependence for instants the same as
his account of dependence for collections of instants. Or is he working with different notions here?
Similarly for ‘responsibility’ and ‘relevance’.
If we look at Smith’s first argument we begin to wonder why he doesn’t follow it out to it’s
mathematical conclusion. Why doesn’t he reason as follows: Let i be an instant in (t− δ, t+ δ)− t.
Then pick ε so that i ∈ (t − δ, t − ε) ∪ (t + ε, t + δ). Then i is not responsible, or is irrelevant to
the implications (t − δ, t + δ) − t carries. But since i is arbitrary we have that every single instant
in (t− δ, t+ δ)− t is irrelevant. Surely Smith doesn’t neglect this line of reasoning because he only
wishes to establish the weaker conclusion that most of the points in (t− δ, t+ δ)− t are irrelevant.
He plausibly neglects this line because it seems somewhat paradoxical. We are given a collection of
instants and we are given that this collection has implications for the velocity at t. If we reason as
above we conclude that not a single instant in that collection is responsible for the implications the
collection has. We might be tempted from here to conclude that the collection of instants (taken as
a whole) is not responsible for the implications that it carries. This would be too quick. A collection
can have properties that no individual member of the collection has. So whether or not a collection
of instants is responsible for the implications that it carries wouldn’t necessarily have anything to do
with whether or not its individual members are individually responsible for the implications that the
collection carries. Smith might hold the position that every single instant is individually irrelevant
but that the instants are collectively relevant or responsible. We need an account. Every instant is a
member of a collection that has implications (so one might think that every instant is relevant) but
it’s also a member of some collection that doesn’t have implications (so one might think that every
instant is irrelevant). At any rate I think the arguments are interesting and in need of formalizing.
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Definitions
To make Smith’s argument precise we need some definitions15. Throughout we will be concerned
with the spatial trajectory of an object, in one dimension, as a function of time. The object is
assumed to have positions in the temporal interval, (a, b), and we are interested in the velocity at
t0, where a < t0 < b. f , g vary over functions of t with domain (a, b). X, Y vary over subsets,
proper or improper, of (a, b). Since we are interested in finding non-t points that are constrained
within or have implications for the velocity at t we will assume that X does not contain t. f |X is the
function with domain X, and f |X ⊂ f means that f is a function with domain (a, b) that extends
f |X . v ranges over all the possible values of the velocity at t0 including the “undefined” value unless
otherwise noted.
If (∃f |X)(∀f ⊃ f |X)(f ′(t0) 6= v) for defined v, then we say that the velocity at t0 constrains the
position development within X and write CW (v, f,X).16
If (∃f |(a,b)−X)(f |(a,b)−X)′(t0) = v and (∃f |X)(∃g|X)((f |(a,b)−X∪f |X)′(t0) 6= (f |(a,b)−X∪g|X)′(t0))
then we say the position development on X has implications for the values of the velocity at t0 and
write I(f |X , v) .
For a proof of CW (v, f |X) ≡ I(f |X , v) see appendix 2.
WR(X) =df If I(X) or CW (X), then X is weakly responsible for the value of the velocity at
t. Or equivalently (for those who read the proof) if X is nice, then X is weakly responsible for the
value of the velocity at t.
Smith accepts that I((t− δ, t+ δ)− t) and CW ((t− δ, t+ δ)− t) but denies that this is enough
to attribute the velocity to all of (t− δ, t+ δ)− t because it fails as follows:
Crucial Failing: There exists proper subsets Y, Y ′ of X such that WR(Y ) and ∼WR(Y ′)
15In what follows I’m greatly indebted to Paul Teller for suggesting helpful notation, criticizing and refining the
definitions, and most importantly for recognizing the logical relations between dependence, constraint throughout,
and the condition of failure Smith endorses.
16We require that v be defined since it makes little sense to think that an undefined velocity constrains anything.
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Smith advocates a stronger condition than just A2. In the implication case it’s not enough for
a set to have implications for the velocity at t the velocity must depend on that set. And in the
constraint case it’s not enough for a set to be constrained within it must be constrained throughout.
D(X) =df WR(X) ∧ (∀Y ⊂ X) ∼ WR(Y ), that is, X is weakly responsible17, but none of its
proper subsets are weakly responsible—here we say the velocity v depends on the position of the
object in set X.
CT (X) =df WR(X)∧ (∀Y ⊆ X)WR(Y ), that is X and all its proper subsets are weakly respon-
sible 18 We say X is constrained throughout by the velocity.
Dependence and constraint throughout are the two different ways of avoiding that which Smith
insists is a potential failing of WR(X). Smith agrees that WR(X) is a necessary condition for the
course of values in X being somehow responsible for constraining the value of v. But he maintains
that as a second necessary condition we must also have:
I. ∼ (∃Y1 ⊂ X)(∃Y2 ⊂ X)[WR(Y1)∧ ∼WR(Y2)]
This is just a formal denial of the crucial failing and it’s easily equivalent to:
II. (∀Y1 ⊂ X)(∀Y2 ⊂ X)[∼WR(Y1) ∨WR(Y2)]
which is, in turn, equivalent to
III. (∀Y1 ⊂ X) ∼WR(Y1) ∨ (∀Y2 ⊂ X)WR(Y2),
which when conjoined with the other necessary condition, WR(X) gives
IV. [WR(X) ∧ (∀Y1 ⊂ X) ∼WR(Y1)] ∨ [WR(X) ∧ (∀Y2 ⊂ X)WR(Y2)]
which is just,
17Think “has implications for”.
18Think “constrained within”.
30
V. CT (X) ∨D(X)
which we will call strongly responsible written SR(X). Smith denies that A2 is a strong enough
condition. There will be sets that satisfy it but that we should still not attribute the velocity to.
We need something stronger. We need a set that is not only weakly responsible but also strongly
responsible for the implications it carries. We might call this Smith’s velocity attribution thesis (for
short SVAT) and formulate it thus:
SVAT: The velocity at t should only be considered a property, in part, of the object on X, if
SR(X).
Formalized Argument
Since strong responsibility is a disjunctive condition Smith must argue both that the velocity at
t does not depend on (t− δ, t+ δ), and that (t− δ, t+ δ) is not constrained throughout. This is what
I take it Smith is doing in the quotes in 6.3. With these resources we formalize Smith’s argument.
1. (t− δ, t+ δ)− t has implications for the velocity at t.
2. (t− δ, t− ε) ∪ (t+ ε, t+ δ) does not have implications for the velocity at t.
3. The velocity depends on X only if every subset of it has implications.
4. But (t− δ, t− ε) ∪ (t+ ε, t+ δ) is a subset of (t− δ, t+ δ)− t yet has no implications for the
velocity at t.
5. So the velocity does not depend on (t− δ, t+ δ)− t.
6. The position development is constrained within (t− δ, t+ δ)− t.
7. The position development is not constrained within (t− δ, t− ε) ∪ (t+ ε, t+ δ).
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8. The position development is constrained throughout Y only if every subset of it is constrained
within Y .
9. But the position development on (t− δ, t− ε) ∪ (t+ ε, t+ δ) is a subset of (t− δ, t+ δ)− t yet
is not constrained within.
10. So the position development is not constrained throughout (t− δ, t+ δ)− t.
11. So by conclusion five and nine we have that (t− δ, t+ δ)− t is not strongly responsible for the
implications it has for the velocity at t.
12. By SVAT we should not attribute the velocity to all of (t− δ, t+ δ − t).
Responding to Smith
First, I think both parties are making a mistake in thinking that intrinsic and extrinsic are
contradictories rather than merely contraries. No property or relation can be both intrinsic and
extrinsic (i.e. they are contraries). But not all properties are either intrinsic or extrinsic (i.e.
they are not contradictories), there is a third and forth option. To see this let’s introduce some
terminology. Call a property or relation accompanied iff it coexists with some determinable wholly
distinct contingent object. Both parties assume that all extrinsic properties imply accompaniment.
But consider loneliness (the ontological status not the mental state). This property is extrinsic.
You can not be alone merely in virtue of the way you are i.e. it’s not intrinsic.19 Yet loneliness
does not imply accompaniment. Call extrinsic properties that don’t entail accompaniment negatively
extrinsic. Call extrinsic properties that do imply accompaniment positively extrinsic. Both parties
assume that if velocity is extrinsic it must be positively extrinsic. Smith’s argument shows that
the calculus velocity is not positively extrinsic. Having a velocity does not entail the existence of a
determinable unique open interval of time responsible or constrained by the i.v. then. But showing
that the velocity is not positively extrinsic doesn’t thereby show that it’s intrinsic—it’s possible
19See Lewis [10].
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that it’s negatively extrinsic (in fact it is). Albert and Arntzenius’ make the same mistake. Their
arguments show that the instantaneous velocity is not intrinsic. But then they try to pin it on
some larger interval of time suggesting they think ‘extrinsic’ means positively extrinsic. Velocity is
local. It requires an open interval of time around t but no particular one. It’s extrinsic, but only
negatively.20
Second, Smith is playing down the popularity of the independence intuition. Tooley [14] held
that the intuition could be used as an argument against the calculus definition. Given that velocity
is an intrinsic property, and given the independence intuition, the calculus definition can’t be right
since it would violate independence. Whether right or wrong, the point is that even those who argue
that the velocity is intrinsic seem to hold the intuition.
Lastly and related, Smith fails to recognize a plausible motivation for the independence intuition.
To my mind it’s motivated by the notion of intrinsicality itself. The instantaneous state of an object
at t is characterized by all the intrinsic properties had by that object at t.21 And it’s intrinsicality
that demands the independence. Just recall what people want out of a notion of intrinsicality:
Lewis says, “The intrinsic properties of something depend only on that thing; whereas the extrinsic
properties of something may depend, wholly or partly, on something else.” Kim’s account involved
not being rooted outside times at which it is had i.e. “Necessarily for any object x and any time t,
x has the property G at t only if x exists at some time before or after t.” It’s clear that the concept
of intrinsicality demands this type of independence and all our arguments, Albert and Arntzenius,
Tooley worlds (below), and myself, assume velocity is intrinsic.
We now move on to the second part of the argument.
20See Butterfield [4] for a similar response.
21The instantaneous state regards just the physical state. If not the intuition would be clearly false. Truth value
links must be preserved on any account of time. If E occurs at t then at t′, with t < t′, it must be true that E
occurred at t. That’s not logical or conceptual independence.
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9 Tooley worlds
In the previous section we argued that the calculus definition of instantaneous velocity is not in-
trinsic. We took up the calculus definition because it is the most widely accepted account. In this
quick section I’ll drop that assumption and assume rather that instantaneous velocity is an intrinsic
property. I’ll argue that even if instantaneous velocity is intrinsic, Sider’s argument still holds.
Sider points to small worlds as problems for the maximizing continuity principle. I’m going to
employ the same strategy here. Tooley [15] imagines a class of worlds that are problematic for
the instantaneous velocity principle. In these worlds the position of an object at any given time is
completely random. As it happens some lucky objects end up with continuous and differentiable
trajectories. Furthermore instantaneous velocity is an intrinsic feature of objects at times in these
worlds. Call such worlds Tooley worlds. Now we have a problem for IVP. The problem is not that
it can’t distinguish a, b, and c. But that it would get many Tooley worlds wrong. If we fix the
discontinuously moving objects so their position developments match up with their instantaneous
velocities we will have completely screwed up the world. In such a world the velocity of an object is
independent of it’s position development. So matching the two up will get the wrong result.22
Thus even if instantaneous velocity is intrinsic, a version of Sider’s argument still looms. This
concludes our discussion of the IVP principle. We have only one final matter to attend to.
22This type of example will generalize for acceleration. Suppose our Tooley worlds also had acceleration as an
intrinsic feature of objects. If they are really intrinsic then they would be independent of velocity and position. So
again a bridge principle like, make sure the acceleration match’s up with the changes in velocity of objects, would fail
to get it right as well.
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10 Zimmerman’s Response
In this section we’re going to consider Dean Zimmerman’s [17] response to Sider’s argument. He’s
one of the few presentists whom directly addresses the issue. His response has three parts. First,
he assumes substantivalism with respect to GR. Second, he argues for an A-theoretically privileged
foliation of the GR space-time manifold. Lastly, he presents three different views—the ghostly box,
the empty box, and the surrogate strategy—regarding the ontological status of currently unoccupied
points within the manifold. Essentially these three strategies attempt to incorporate the backward
looking portions of the Minkowski space-time manifold, complete with metrical structure, into the
presentist picture. This is supposed to get him all the facts required to fully determine the trajectories
of objects and hence how to line up the “snapshots” thus saving presentism.
10.1 An A-theoretically Privileged Foliation
In SR and GR it’s often taken that there is no privileged now. Time is relative to ones inertial
reference frame. But Zimmerman argues that there is in fact a privileged now. Or better that there
is a slicing up of the GR manifold (a foliation) into sets of points of the manifold all of which were
happening all at once. Here’s his argument that there is one and what it’s kinda like (1)-(8) and
how to arrive at it (9)-(D2). I’ll lay out the argument and formulation then pick at them.
(1) There is an objective, important difference between events that are really happening to me,
and ones that merely did or will happen to me; and the events that are really happening to
me are confined to a tiny region, r, on the world-line I will eventually have traced through the
manifold.
(2) I am not metaphysically special, unique among all human beings with respect to some impor-
tant, objective feature of the manifold; neither is the region r, nor is my world-line.
(3) If the only events in the universe that are really happening are the ones happening to me at
r, then r and I would be very special.
35
(4) Events are really happening to me, at r, and to many other objects at points on their paths
through the manifold. (From 1, 2, & 3).
(5) According to SR, the only geometrically distinguished subsets of points that include r, along
with many other locations in the manifold, are the following: (a) the points at space-like
distance from r,...(b) the points in or on r’s forward light-cone; (c) the points in or on r’s
backward light-cone; (d) the points on the various planes associated, by the Radar method,
with continuous paths passing through r; (e) three “hyperboloids of revolution” about r; or
(f) some set of points definable in terms of these distinctions. See figure 3.
(6) If the region in which events are happening were restricted to (a), (b), (c), (d), or (e), I or r
or my world-line would be very special.
(7) If the region in which events are really happening coincided with a set of points including r
that are geometrically distinguished, according to SR, then I or r or my world-line would be
very special. (From 5, & 6).
(8) There is a region of the manifold in which events are really happening, it includes r and many
other points, and it does not coincide with any region that is geometrically distinguished,








I think this argument is seductive though it’s invalid. Although (4) doesn’t strictly follow from
(1)-(3) we can see a sorites series of regions that eventually crosses over into the clearly not-special
cases once they start containing “many” events. That is, all we can really conclude is that there
is at least one event that’s really happening in region r′ 6= r, but r ∪ r′ will still be special. The
move from (6) to (7) also doesn’t follow since option (f) was never ruled out, but this too can be
overlooked. We should also not be too worried about the ambiguity in the assumed uniqueness of
“the region in which events are really happening”. I’m assuming that a region of the manifold is just
a set of space-time points and that no connectedness is assumed (as that would be unwarranted). So
I find no serious objects to Zimmerman’s argument thus far; assuming presentism were true there
would be a unique present not geometrically distinguished by SR. So far so good. Zimmerman then
tries to further describe the geometric properties of the region in which events are really happening
i.e. the present.
37
(9) For any events e1 and e2, e2 is causally dependent upon e1 only if, when e2 was happening, e1
had already happened.
(10) If a particle, photon, or wave occupies a path in the manifold, its occupancy of a point r on
that path is causally dependent upon its having occupied the points on that path that stand
in light-like or inertial accessibility relations to r.
(D1) S is the immediate causal environment of the current state s of x23 =df S is the set of all pairs
〈y, z〉 such that y is a particle, wave, or other process and z is a current state of y that could,
at some point, come to have an effect upon a state of x that is also partly causally dependent
upon x’s current state s.
(D2) R is the universe of x, relative to the current state s of x =df R is the smallest region satisfying
the following recursive condition: for every pair 〈y1, z1〉 in the immediate causal environment
of x’s current state s, R includes the location at which z1 is happening to y1; for each such
〈y1, z1〉, and for every pair 〈y2, z2〉 in the immediate causal environment of y1’s current state
z1, R includes the location at which z2 is happening to y2; and so on.
According to Zimmerman the present (the universe of x, relative to current state s of x) is a
very thin slice through the space-like region of x’s light-cone. The argument is quite simple. First,
let r be the location of x relative to the current state s. Then R can’t include a point p in or on the
forward or backward light-cone of r. Suppose it did. Then there would be an inertial or light-like
path from r to p or from p to r. Suppose the former and that a particle β followed that path from
r to p. Then by (10) β’s occupying p would be causally dependent upon it’s having occupied the
points on that path that stand in light-like or inertial accessibility relations to p. Specifically β’s
occupying p would be partially causally dependent upon it’s occupying r. But then by (9) when
β’s occupying p was happening, β’s occupying r had already happened. So p can’t be in R since
any state of an object at p wouldn’t be a current state. The other case is handled similarly. So
23I’ll write ICE(x, s).
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(9) and (10) establish that the present cuts across the space-like region. But how do we know it’s
exceedingly thin? Well suppose both 〈y, z〉 and 〈y, z′〉 were both in ICE(x, s). Then both z and
z′ are supposed to be the current state of the same object y. But either z′ is causally dependent
upon z or vice versa. In either case when one was happening the other had already happened. This
makes R skinny.
Now that we kinda get the picture let me note some problems. First (9) rules out the possibility
of backwards causation. I see no reason to do so but I won’t make a fuss. Second, (10) has an







In figure 4 β moves faster than light and relativity theory doesn’t rule out the possibility of
faster than light travel. It prohibits particles that are at one time not moving faster than light from
accelerating faster than light (as this would require an infinite amount of energy) but it doesn’t
prohibit particles from always traveling above light speed. But even if physics did rule out the
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possibility of faster than light travel I don’t think one’s metaphysics of space-time should do so.
Notice also that the universe of x may not contain the whole universe. There could for instance
be a particle separated by so much space-time from x and the things in it’s ICE and the things in
their ICE and so on, that it’s causally unrelated to anything in the universe of x. Now intuitively
this particle is still part of the universe and, maybe, present. Yet Zimmerman’s account will rule it
out.
Despite all my objections there’s really no use in stalling on Zimmerman’s account of a privileged
foliation. If presentism is true then there really is one and it doesn’t matter what it looks like. Still
this doesn’t mean the presentist automatically has a solution to Sider. Let’s get to the part where
Zimmerman offers a solution.
10.2 Two Views
Zimmerman develops three frameworks he thinks can resolve Sider’s objection but I’ll only consider
the two most plausible the surrogate and the empty-box view. But before we get to them we must
make a distinction. Presentism is the view that the only objects that exist are the ones that presently
exist. This is compatible with two distinct views: 1) the only space-time points that exist are the
ones that presently exist as well and 2) more than just the present space-time points exist! The first
view Zimmerman calls the “one slice presentist”. For them the only space-time points that exist
are the ones constituting the privileged foliation. The second view can be cashed out in infinitely
many ways but Zimmerman discusses only one plausible version, the “growing manifold presentist”.
The growing manifold presentist accepts the existence of not just present space-time points but also
those that were formerly occupied. Thus as time flows the space-time manifold grows.
Zimmerman thinks Sider’s objection relies on the assumption that the presentist must be a one
slice presentist. A “snapshot” of the one slice presentist’s world tells us only the relative distance
relations between objects along with any intrinsic properties had by them. But since no other
space-time points exist, a whole wealth of information is left untapped.
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To remedy this Zimmerman conceives of a growing manifold presentist that takes the existence
of past space-time points very seriously. This “empty-box” view makes two important assumptions
about space-time points: first, that they are substantival in nature, and second, their metric relations
are preserved over time. I’ll call this second assumption metric stability. A “snapshot” of the
empty-box presentist’s world tells us not only the relative distances between objects along with
their intrinsic properties but also it’s exact, enduring, past and presents space-time locations. Since
the metric relations between these space-time points are preserved the empty-box presentist can
read the properties of an object’s path directly off the space-time points it occupied. In this way the
presentist can distinguish between inertial, accelerated, continuous and discontinuous motion thus
resolving Sider’s cross-temporal objection.
Though this approach seems to work Zimmerman thinks he’s got a “still more excellent way”.
He writes,
If one takes for granted the metric structure of Minkowskian space-time or a not-too-
bizare manifold satisfying GR’s constraints, surrogates for past points can easily be
constructed out of the points in the present slice. For each past point, there is a region
in the presently existing slice of the manifold that contains all and only the points on the
slice that were inertially or light-like accessible from the past point; the region in question
is the presently existing slice of the point’s forward light-cone. In SR and foliable GR
space-times, these regions could be used as descriptive names for each formerly-filled,
now non-existent space-time point — each such point has exactly one point-surrogate
in the presently existing slice. If the presentist is allowed to help herself to the facts
about which collections of points constitute point-surrogates, the current geometry of
the present slice will include enough information to recover all the facts about which
past space-time points constituted inertial and light-like paths. [17]
Now though this is Zimmerman’s preferred solution I don’t think it’s as excellent as the empty-
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box view. Consider the following problem the empty-box view can solve. Suppose a particle follows
a path β past a large star. The star curves space-time and thus β is accelerated. But the past space-
time points in the empty-box don’t contain the star, they don’t contain anything. So β is inertial
rather than accelerated. The empty-box view has a simple fix. Since space-time is substantival the
empty-box view has the fact that the large star was at a certain space-time location and since space-
time is metrically stable they know, now, exactly which point that is. Given this and facts about
the intrinsic nature of the star (it’s mass and shape and such) the empty-box view can figure out
whether β was inertial or accelerated. The substantival and metric stability assumptions generate a
fabric of cross-temporal spatial relations between space-time points. All other cross-temporal spatial
relations piggy back off them and the intrinsic properties of objects had at times. If you drop either
of these assumptions the view fails so we can now see why the surrogate view fails.
The surrogate view almost looks like it can handle this problem. But in fact the surrogate view
begs the question. Suppose we ask the proponents of the surrogate view if β is inertial or accelerated.
All they need to do is look at the particle at each moment and its distance relation to the star, how
massive the star is etc., and piggy back off the cross-temporal relations between the space-time
points constituting β. In this way they can distinguish inertial from accelerated paths. But the
reason they can solve this problem is because it already grants them cross-temporal relations they
don’t have access to. Let me explain.
Let t1 be the present. We take every possible light sphere at t1 to be a surrogate for some past
space-time point. We take the present space-time points as surrogates for themselves. Then we add
accessibility relations to these surrogates, namely, light-like, space-like, and time-like accessibility
relations. Now we have our space-time points and we have our metric. We can now add all the objects
that exist at t1 to the present surrogates. But now what? Suppose O is at s1 = 〈〈x1, x2, x3〉, t1〉
and we want to figure out its past trajectory. Which surrogate represents its space-time point at say
t0 < t1? That is where was it earlier in relation to where it is now? The surrogate view can’t say.
Although it has all the cross-temporal relations between space-time points worked out it doesn’t
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have any for objects! So while it can tell us which space-time points do constitute an inertial or
accelerated path it still can’t tell us where objects are across time and thus can’t tell us whether
their path is accelerated or inertial i.e. because it can’t tell us what it’s path is in the first place.24
So Zimmerman’s preferred surrogate view fails. But the empty-box view does solve Sider’s cross-
temporal spatial relations objection. So we do have a solution. But what is the cost of that solution?
Zimmerman argues that the cost is minimal. He writes,
The space-time manifolds of SR and GR resemble quarks and dark matter more than
they resemble horses and wars, with respect to our reasons for believing in them. They
are theoretically posited entities that earn their keep by the crucial roles they play in
successful scientific theories. Suppose I come to believe in a four-dimensional manifold
with a specified structure because interactions among objects alone are not enough to to
explain why observable things behave as they do. Should this bother me, as a presentists?
Not much, I think. A space-time manifold is a strange beast — at least, when it is
construed substantivally, as a sort of four-dimensional, invisible, permeable cosmic jell-o.
The manifold of Galilean or Minkowskian space-time, and the manifolds allowed by GR,
and not the kinds of thing one should have posited, had they not seemed necessary to
play a role in some well-confirmed scientific theory. An A-theorist, like everyone else,
should look to science for information about the structure of such things, including their
metrical properties and the number of dimensions they have. My convictions about the
unreality of past and future objects and events, on the other hand, are convictions about
horses and wars and people; they have little to do with questions about what sorts of
theoretical entities should be allowed to figure in scientific theories.
What is the argument? The conclusion is that the cost of accepting the ongoing existence of
formerly occupied parts of the manifold (the empty-box) is not very high. But the mentioned
24I’d like to thank Josh for pointing this problem out to me.
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considerations fail to bare on that conclusion? For instance we can grant that space-time manifolds
resemble quarks more than horses with respect to why we believe in them. We believe in horses
because we can sense them. But we believe in space-time manifolds because they “earn their keep” in
scientific theories. We can grant that manifolds are strange, theoretical entities. But does this mean
that a metaphysical theory that posits them in its ontology is thereby not charged for them? No.
The fact is that this “merely theoretical” entity is pulling a great deal of weight for the presentist.
Without it they have no solution to Sider’s objection. So the fact that it is theoretical, or strange,
or not the kind of thing one would typically posit unless science deemed it necessary, is irrelevant.
One might even argue that these considerations bear in the opposite direction but I won’t push it.
So, who am I to judge? I’m an B-theorist after all and have the entire space-time manifold
and objects in my metaphysics. So what cost are the presentists paying that I’m not? First, the
empty-box view doesn’t “look to science” in the way Zimmerman suggests. Minkowskian space-time
is an E4 Euclidian four dimensional space-time. But the empty-box view imposes extra structure on
space-time making it E3 × E1 thus making the notions of temporal separation, spatial separation,
and simultaneity well defined. Maybe this is a minor cost. Secondly, the empty-box view has a very
strange asymmetry with respect to substance. Consider some substance, say water. It exists now at
t1 and is located at the substance (the space-time point) 〈〈x1, x2, x3〉, t1〉. But a moment later at t2
one substance, the water at 〈〈x1, x2, x3〉, t1〉 ceases to exist while the other substance 〈〈x1, x2, x3〉, t1〉
itself continues to exist. How does one reconcile this tension? If space-time isn’t substantival then
there is no solution to Sider, if it is, then why does it get to stick around while other substances
don’t? I think this brings out the ad hoc nature of Zimmerman’s solution. Thirdly, the empty-box
view seems to have little justification for accepting past but not future space-time points. Scientists
making predictions or plotting a trajectory to the moon are employing the future space-time points
of the manifold. That is, cross-temporal spatial relations don’t just hold for past objects. This is
a minor and contentious point so I don’t stress it. Lastly, the presentist that adopts this solution
must be a substantivalist. But the substantivalism/relationalism debate is hardly settled and one
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wouldn’t have thought they would be forced into substantivalist just to answer Sider’s objection.
The B-theorist has none of these problems.
So although Zimmerman does give us a response to Sider’s cross-temporal relations problem,
what’s required to accept it seems, to my mind, and probably even more so to the average presentist’s
mind, (since they fancy themselves the champions of common sense), much too high a price to pay.
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11 Conclusion
What’s occurred in this paper? My main argument is this. Presentism can’t deal with cross-
temporal relations. We considered a few moves the presentist could make against the argument
from cross-temporal relations. I found several unsatisfactory. But not all were doomed. I identified
a strain of presentism with enough resources to provide a supervenience basis that could deal with
potentially all CT -sentences. But there was a glitch. Any such view still couldn’t account for
cross-temporal spatial relations. In particular they could not distinguish continuous accelerated,
continuous unaccelerated, and discontinuous motion. The supervenience basis simply wasn’t rich
enough. We considered two ways of enriching it. First the instantaneous velocity principle. I
argued that this attempt fails because instantaneous velocity (as defined by calculus) is not intrinsic.
Second Zimmerman’s surrogate and empty-box view. I argued that while the surrogate view doesn’t
represent a solution the empty-box view does enrich the supervenience basis enough to answer Sider’s
objection. Unfortunately the cost of accepting the empty-box view seems too high. The conclusion
then is that the cross-temporal relations represent a serious threat to the presentist’s position. This
is one of the main reasons I prefer the eternalist picture of space-time.
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Appendix 1: The Calculus Definition of Instantaneous
Velocity
In this appendix we’ll discuss the calculus definition of instantaneous velocity. For this the concept
of a limit is crucial. Heres the intuitive idea of a limit: if, as the inputs of a function get closer to
some number a the outputs get closer to some number L, then L is the limit of that function as the
inputs tend toward a. For example, lets see what f(x) = 2x2 + 3 does as the inputs tend toward
2. When x is 3 f(x) = 21, and when x is 1f(x) = 5 so that the limit is somewhere between 5 and
21. If we take numbers closer to 2 say 1.9 and 2.1 we get 10.22 and 11.82 respectively. Still closer
numbers, say 1.99 and 2.01, give us 10.9202 and 11.802 respectively. Still closer numbers, say 1.9999
and 2.0001, give us 10.99920002 and 11.00080002 respectively. Clearly as we take inputs closer to
2, from either the right or the left, the outputs get closer and closer to 11. So the limit as x tends
toward 2 of f(x) is 11. And thats expected since f(2) = 11 . We write this as
lim
x→2
2x2 + 3 = 11
and read it,“2x2 + 3 tends toward 11 when x tends toward ” or “the limit, as x tends toward 2, of




Assume f is defined on some interval around a. If for any positive number ε there exists a positive
number δ such that 0 <| x− a |< δ implies that | f(x)− L |< ε , then L is said to be the limit of f




ε is viewed as a challenge and δ is the response. You give me a small number, say .01 and I try
to find a small (usually smaller) number δ such that any inputs in the δ-neighborhood of a will be
within a distance of .01 from L. For example, consider the function f(x) = 3x and say we want to
know if the limit as x approaches 2 is 6—as it looks. We can start by playing the game: you give
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me .1 and now I need to find a δ that satisfies the conditions. Since we want | 3x− 6 |< .1 we have
3 | x− 2 |< .1 and | x− 2 | .13 = .033333333. So if we pick δ = .033333333 then | 3x− 6 | will be less




since we have considered only one of an uncountably many εs needing consideration. Since we cant
look at each number individually we look at an arbitrary ε and find a general δ in terms of it. Let
ε be given. We want | 3x− 6 |< ε when | x− 2 |< δ for some δ. From the above it should be clear
that when δ = ε3 and | x− 2 |< δ we have | 3x− 6 |< ε. So limx→2 3x = 6 does indeed equal 6. The
notion of an instantaneous velocity can now be precisely defined. Let f be the position function of
an object O, defined on at least some open interval of time around t and ∆t be a small change in






exists and is finite, it is called the instantaneous velocity of O at t.
48
Appendix 2: Proof of CW (v, f |X) ≡ I(f |X , v)
Here we show that CW (v, f |X) ≡ I(f |X , v).
Proof:
Call a set X nice iff for any open set O with t0 ∈ O,O ∩X 6= ∅. We will show that CW (v,X) ≡
Xis nice ≡ I(X, f |X).
Part 1: CW (v,X) iff X is nice.
(←)
Suppose ¬CW (v,X). Then (∀f |X)(∃f ⊇ f |X)(f ′(t0) = v). Suppose for reductio that X is nice.
Then for any open interval O there is an x 6= t0 ∈ O. Another way to put this is that for any positive
δ there exists an x ∈ X such that 0 < |x − t0| < δ. Being nice doesn’t tell us a whole lot about
X but we at least know that X has a countably infinite number of members that get progressively
closer to t0. Let a set of those members be X ′. Index X ′ in the obvious way letting the furthest
member from t0 be indexed by 0 (if there is no furthest just pick an arbitrary element and index in
from there).
Now let
f |X = { f |X(x) = c, if x ∈ X ′ and x is indexed by an even numberf |X(x) = m otherwise
So f |X maps the evenly indexed elements in X ′ to c and every other element, including the oddly
indexed elements in X ′ to m. Let m and c be such that m < c and |c −m| = 1. Let v be given
and let f be the (or an) extension of f |X such that f ′(t0) = v. Since v is defined f is differentiable
at t0 and is therefore continuous at t0. But f can’t be continuous at t0 given that it extends f |X .
To see this let ε = 1. Since f is supposed to be continuous at t0 there must exist a δ such that for
any t ∈ dom(f) such that |t − t0| < δ implies that |f(t) − f(t0)| < ε. But for any positive δ there
exists an evenly indexed x and an oddly indexed y < x in X ′ such that both 0 < |x − t0| < δ and
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0 < |y − t0| < δ. By continuity we should have both |c− f(t0)| < ε and |m− f(t0)| < ε. There are
five cases: if f(t0) = c or f(t0) = m then we have that |1| < ε = 1 which is bad. If f(t0) < m then
|c− f(t0)| 6< ε and vice versa if c < f(t0). If m < f(t0) < c then we just pick an ε less than 1/2 and
one or the other requirement will fail. So f is not continuous at t0. So X is not nice.
(→)
Again by contraposition. Assume X is not nice. Then there is an open interval O such that
X ∩ O = ∅. Let v and f |X be given. Now all we do is define f so that within O it behaves so
that f ′(t0) = v. But then we have (∀f |X)(∃f ⊇ f |X)(f ′(t0) = v) since f |X was arbitrary. So by
contraposition we have that if C(v,X), then X is nice.
Part 2: X is nice iff I(X, v).
(→)
Suppose X is nice and ¬I(X, v). Then
∀f |(a,b)−X , (f |(a,b)−X)′(t0) 6= v
or
∀f |X∀g|X [(f |(a,b)−X ∪ f |X)′(t0) = (f |(a,b)−X ∪ g|X)′(t0)]
Suppose ∀f |(a,b)−X , (f |(a,b)−X)′(t0) 6= v. Then there is an open interval O such that (a, b) −
X ∩ O = ∅. So X is really nice (it has an entire open interval as a subset) and so we have that
(∃f |X)(∃g|X)((f |(a,b)−X ∪ f |X)′(t0) 6= (f |(a,b)−X ∪ g|X)′(t0)).
Either (f |(a,b)−X)′(t0) 6= v where v = u or (f |(a,b)−X)′(t0) 6= v where v is real. It’s always
possible for (f |(a,b)−X)′(t0) = u. So v 6= u. Either there are other real values m (at least one)
such that there is an (f |(a,b)−X)′(t0) = m or this constraint holds for every real number. If it holds
for every real number v then (f |(a,b)−X)′(t0) is neither real nor undefined which is bad. If there is
an f |(a,b)−X such that (f |(a,b)−X)′(t0) = m for m 6= v and m ∈ <, then the velocity is completely
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determined within (a, b) − X. So there must be an open interval O such that O ⊆ (a, b) − X on
which the velocity is defined. But then O ∩X = ∅. But this contradicts the niceness of X.
Now suppose ∀f |X∀g|X((f |(a,b)−X ∪ f |X)′(t0) = (f |(a,b)−X ∪ g|X)′(t0)). Then the velocity is
completely determined by f |(a,b)−X . So there is an open interval O such that O ⊆ (a, b)−X. But
then O ∩X = ∅. But this contradicts the niceness of X. So our hypothesis leads to a contradiction
in both cases. So X must have implications for the values of the velocity at t0.
(←)
Suppose I(X, v) yet X is not nice. Since X is not nice there is an open interval O such that
O ∩ X = ∅. So O ∈ (a, b) − X and the velocity is completely determined by f |O. But then
∀f |X∀g|X((f |O∪f |X)′(t0) = (f |O∪g|X)′(t0)) and so ∀f |X∀g|X((f |(a,b)−X ∪f |X)′(t0) = (f |(a,b)−X ∪
g|X)′(t0)). But then it’s not the case that I(X, v). A contradiction. So X is nice after all.
51
References
[1] David Albert. Time and Chance. Cambridge, MA Harvard University Press, 2000.
[2] Frank Arntzenius. Are there really instantaneous velocities? The Monist, 83(2):187–208, 2000.
[3] Craig Bourne. A Future for Presentism. Oxford University Press, 2009.
[4] Jeremy Butterfield. Against pointillism about mechanics. British Journal for the Philosophy of
Science, 57(4):709–753, 2005.
[5] Roderick Chisholm. Events without times an essay on ontology. No us, 24(3):413–427, 1990.
[6] Thomas Crisp. Presentism and “cross-time” relations. American Philosophical Quarterly,
42(1):5–17, 2006.
[7] Matthew Davidson. Presentism and the non-present. Philosophical Studies, 113(1):77–92, 2003.
[8] William James. The will to believe. In Bruce Wilshire, editor, William James The Essential
Writings. State University of New York Press, Albany, 1984.
[9] Jaegwon Kim. Psycholphysical supervenence. Philosophical Studies, 1982.
[10] David Lewis. Extrinsic properties. Philosophical Studies, 44(2):197, 1983.
[11] Theodore Sider. Presentism and ontological commitment. The Journal of Philosophy, 96(7):325–
347, 1999.
[12] Theodore Sider. Four-Dimensionalism. Oxford, 2004.
[13] Sheldon Smith. Are instantaneous velocities real and really instantaneous?: an argument for
the affirmative. Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics, 34:261–280, 2003.
[14] Michael Tooley. In defense of the existence of states of motion. The Journal of Philosophy,
16(1), 1988.
52
[15] Michael Tooley. Time Tense & Causation. Oxford University Press, 1997.
[16] Giuliano Torrengo. Time and Cross-Temporal Relations. Mimesis Edizioni, 2008.
[17] Dean Zimmerman. Presentism and the space-time manifold. Forthcoming in Craig Callender,
editor,Oxford Handbook of Time.
53
